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Improving education outcomes is a key priority for governments around the 
world. The accumulating evidence suggests poor returns from simply raising school 
resources
1, so attention has turned to other mechanisms such as school choice, and 
incentives for teachers. Hanushek (2003) highlights these: “The alternative set of 
potential policies emphasizes performance incentives.” (p. F93), but goes on to note that 
there is very little robust evidence yet on the impact of such incentives (p. F94). In this 
paper we start to plug that gap. In 1999, the UK government introduced a performance-
related pay policy for teachers, with pupil progress (value-added) as one of its key 
criteria. Using longitudinal teacher-level data and a difference-in-difference research 
design, we provide a quantitative evaluation of the policy’s impact on test score gains.  
The incentive scheme was explicitly teacher-based (rather than school-based) and 
so equivalent data is required to properly evaluate it. We have collected longitudinal data 
following teachers over two complete two-year teaching cycles, before and after the 
policy was introduced. By dealing with schools directly we were able to link pupils to the 
teachers who taught them for specific subjects, and not rely on school level averages. 
This is a crucial attribute of our data: school averages would not allow us to directly 
compare the performance of eligible and ineligible teachers. For the pupils linked to the 
sample teachers, we collected prior attainment data, so we can control for pupil 
characteristics and measure the target of the scheme – pupil progress. Thus in the analysis 
we can control for pupil and teacher fixed effects.  
                                                  
1 See Hanushek (2003).   2 
We find important effects of the incentive scheme, that are both statistically and 
economically significant. We find that teachers eligible for the incentive payment 
increased their value-added by almost half a GCSE grade per pupil relative to ineligible 
teachers, equal to 73% of a standard deviation. GCSE exams, taken at age 16, are the key 
qualifications for entry into higher education, so these are high stakes tests and this 
increase is not trivial. We find significant differences between subjects, with eligible 
maths teachers showing no effect of the scheme.  
Our difference-in-difference research design means that differences in general 
between eligible and ineligible teachers drop out once comparisons are made over time. 
We compute the change in each teacher’s average test score gain between two complete 
teaching cycles, and compare the results for eligible and ineligible teachers. In the 
scheme, the chance to earn the initial performance bonus was offered to teachers who had 
been in the profession for about 8 years. Thus eligible and ineligible teachers differed 
systematically in experience, and such differences in experience will not drop out of the 
difference-in-difference if there is a non-linear experience-effectiveness relationship. 
Specifically, if teachers improve in their capacity to generate value-added but at a 
decreasing rate, then all else equal we would see greater improvements in progress 
between the two teaching cycles for the less experienced (ineligible) group. Therefore we 
also perform regression analysis, controlling for teacher experience, detailed in section 6. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the 
literature on incentive schemes for teachers. Section 3 discusses the UK scheme and 
section 4 our evaluation methodology. Section 5 describes the data and section 6 presents 
the results. Finally, section 7 offers some conclusions.   3 
 
2 Previous literature 
There is a large literature on the effects of incentives in the private sector (see 
Prendergast (1999) and Murphy (1999) for surveys).  There is a smaller but growing body 
of evidence about incentives in the public sector (see surveys by Dixit (2002) and 
Burgess and Ratto (2003)). Some recent empirical work has produced convincing results 
suggesting that incentives do affect the behaviour of employees in particular parts of the 
public sector (see, for example, Courty and Marschke (2001) and Kahn, Silva and Ziliak 
(2001)). 
There is some quantitative evidence on the effects of teacher incentive schemes 
on pupil attainment. The literature has been hampered by difficulties in finding 
measurable proxies for key variables, in obtaining individual-level data, and in designing 
evaluations which include adequate controls when incentive schemes are not introduced 
as part of an experimental design. Lazear (2003) sets out a theoretical framework for 
thinking about performance-related pay (PRP) for teachers. He discusses the pros and 
cons of PRP in general, and then as applied to the case of teachers. PRP plays two roles – 
an incentive mechanism to elicit greater effort, and a recruitment and retention device to 
improve average teacher quality. Our study focuses on the former, and we briefly review 
previous findings on this issue.  
Early studies by Ladd (1999), by Cooper and Cohn (1997) and by Boozer (1999) 
found a positive relationship between incentive schemes and pupil attainment, however 
the results of these studies are not conclusive. Ladd (1999) compared gains in school-
level test scores in Dallas with gains in other cities, to evaluate the impact of a school-  4 
level bonus scheme introduced in Dallas. The study is limited by the lack of data enabling 
“before/after” comparisons, or controls for pupil, teacher or school fixed effects, however 
Ladd is able to control for a number of school characteristics, such as racial mix and 
relative deprivation. The results are generally positive, in that pass rates appeared to 
increase faster in Dallas than in other cities. Effects differ by ethnic sub-groups, being 
most positive for Hispanics and whites, and insignificant for blacks. The results are, 
however, muddied by the fact that a positive Dallas effect is also found for the year 
before the scheme was introduced. 
Cooper and Cohn (1997) and Boozer (1999) evaluate a South Carolina scheme, 
which included both school-level rewards and rewards to individual teachers. Pupil 
effects are controlled for, since the dependent variables are gain in median class test 
scores, and the studies also control for teacher characteristics and for class-level pupil 
characteristics. The incentive plan variables were positive and significant. However this 
variable confounds both incentive effects and selection effects, since teachers could 
choose whether or not to apply for an award. As Cooper and Cohn put it, “It is possible, 
even likely, that only the most productive teachers choose to apply for an award” 
(pp.320-1).  
Studies by Eberts et al.(2000), by Figlio and Kenny (2003) and by Dee and Keys 
(2004) were able to use rich data sets to control for many potentially confounding 
variables. It is, however, notable that although these papers assess the relationship 
between incentive schemes and pupil attainment, they evaluate schemes which did not 
directly link rewards to pupil attainment. Promotion was based on overall good 
performance, which included time spent in the classroom, evidence of skills and   5 
classroom evaluation; test results were not the major deciding factor in measuring 
‘success’.  Eberts et al (2000) used difference-in-difference techniques to assess the 
impact on pupil attainment of a Michigan merit pay scheme which rewarded individual 
teachers according to student retention rates and their performance on pupil evaluation 
questionnaires. The scheme did not directly target pupil attainment although it was hoped 
that this would be an indirect benefit of the scheme. The scheme had a positive and 
significant impact on student retention. However, pass rates decreased, and attendance 
rates and grade point averages were unchanged. The authors conclude “that incentive 
systems within complex organisations such as schools,…may produce results that are 
unintended and at times misdirected.” (p.19).   
Figlio and Kenny (2003) combine panel data from the US National Education 
Longitudinal Survey to estimate the effects of teacher incentives on an education 
production function.  They define incentive schemes as any merit raise or bonus awarded 
to any proportion of teachers in a school. The variables do not identify whether schemes 
intended rewards to be tied directly to pupil attainment. They control for various student, 
teacher, school and family characteristics. The results are positive, particularly in public 
and poor schools.  Test scores are higher in schemes that are more high powered, in the 
sense of being given to only small numbers of teachers within a school and offering 
higher rewards. However, the results may not be generalisable since the schools that 
responded to the survey are not representative of schools in the US.  
Dee and Keys (2004) use a fixed effects model to estimate incentive effects on 
student SAT scores in the Tennessee STAR and Career Ladder Evaluation schemes. The 
contemporaneous data from STAR reduces the problem of unobserved heterogeneity in   6 
student propensity for achievement. There are controls for pupil, teacher and class fixed 
effects and characteristics. The results show a positive effect, which varies across 
subjects and with teacher seniority. The authors investigated whether the results were 
biased by the high rate of student attrition from the schools participating in STAR by 
imputing test scores for those students who left, but the results remained similar. 
Studies from Kenya and from Israel have been able to capitalize on the 
experimental design of incentive schemes and use difference-in-difference techniques to 
control for confounding variables. Glewwe, Ilias and Kremer (2003) investigate a Kenyan 
school-based incentive scheme, by comparing differences in test scores between 
treatment and comparison schools. Differences in test scores are positive and significant 
in the scheme’s second year in both the random effects and difference-in-difference 
models.  
In a series of papers, Lavy analyses the impact of incentive schemes introduced in 
Israel: two school-level schemes targeted on a variety of outcomes (Lavy 2001); and a 
tournament scheme which rewarded individual teachers according to their pupils’ 
attainment (Lavy 2003, 2004). In the first paper, evaluating the school-level scheme, the 
quasi-experimental design of the scheme allowed Lavy to employ difference in difference 
techniques and control for school fixed effects. Results on all student outcomes are 
positive. The schemes include both financial and non-financial rewards: Lavy compares 
their cost effectiveness and concludes that money incentives are the more effective, but 
that the schools included in the scheme are probably not representative of all Israeli 
schools. Lavy (2003, 2004) uses panel data to evaluate the effects of a teacher-based 
tournament scheme on pupil attainment. A rich dataset allowed for propensity score   7 
matching and OLS estimates to be calculated, controlling for various student (including 
lagged) characteristics and school covariates.  The results are positive and significantly 
different from zero, but are complicated by non random assignment to the program.  
However, identification strategies based on a regression discontinuity design and 
particularly matching, produce similar results, suggesting that there was indeed a positive 
relationship between the incentive scheme and pupil test scores.  The results of a follow 
up survey suggest that the results were achieved by reducing class size and increased 
teacher effort. Again, however, Lavy suggests that the schools may not be a 
representative sample of Israeli schools. 
In summary, the results of the earlier literature in this area are confounded by the 
problems of distinguishing the effects of teacher quality from the effects of increased 
teacher effort, and by the problems of controlling for other fixed effects such as pupil 
ability. Later studies which have been able to use rich data sets to manage identifications 
problems have found a positive relationship between financial incentives and pupil 
attainment. Most studies, including our own, work on an un-representative sample of 
schools.  
 
3 The English education sector and the PRP scheme 
(a) The structure of the English education market 
The English education system has been choice-based since the Education Reform Act of 
1988, which introduced a ‘quasi-market’ in education (Glennerster 1991). The following 
key features of the education quasi-market remain to the present date: some degree of   8 
parental choice on schools, with money following the pupils; funding and management of 
schools devolved to a more local level, but with funding provided by central government, 
out of general taxation revenue. The intention was that per capita funding and parental 
choice would bring about competition between schools for pupils, which would raise 
educational outcomes. While the quasi-market increased the autonomy of individual 
schools, each school still operates within a fairly centralised system. Central government 
regulates the way in which the quasi-market can operate, as well as controlling the 
contents of the national curriculum and the accompanying set of national exams (detailed 
more below). Pay scales for teachers are also centrally determined. 
Parental choice is informed by a range of indicators for each school. The “league 
tables” report the results of exams taken by all pupils at the end of each Key Stage of the 
national curriculum; at ages 7, 11 (taken in primary school), 14 and 16 (taken in 
secondary school). These tests are known respectively as Key Stage 1 (KS1) to Key Stage 
4 (KS4) exams. Pupils take KS1, KS2 and KS3 tests in English, maths and science. KS4 
exams, taken at the end of compulsory schooling, cover a much broader mix of subjects, 
and comprise two different types of exam known as GCSE and GNVQ, the latter 
historically being associated with more vocational subjects. English, maths and science 
are compulsory for all students at KS4 as GCSE exams, in addition to which they are able 
to choose from a broad range of options. For secondary schools (our focus in this paper) 
the primary focus of both schools and parents has been the raw output indicator of the 
proportion of pupils gaining five or more KS4 passes between grades A * and C. In this 
paper, we consider teacher impact on both raw output – GCSE grades – and on value   9 
added, i.e. test score gains between KS3 and GCSE. In all our analyses, we focus on the 
compulsory subjects of English, maths and science to eliminate selection effects.  
(b) The PRP scheme 
Interest in PRP grew during the 1980s, stimulated by a perception that teaching 
standards were poor and contributing to low educational attainment and, perhaps, to poor 
economic performance (Tomlinson 1992, 2000)
2. During the 1990s, successive 
administrations attempted to introduce some form of PRP into state schools, but 
succeeded only in introducing PRP for headteachers and their deputies (Marsden and 
French 1998).  
The 1997 Labour administration signalled a range of reforms to education in a 
consultative Government paper published in 1998: “Teachers: meeting the challenge of 
change”. The reforms included the introduction of a performance-related system, the 
Performance Threshold plus the Upper Pay Scale, designed to affect teacher effort as well 
as recruitment into and retention within the profession. The Green Paper argued that 
teacher motivation was adversely affected by a culture which did not recognise and 
reward outstanding performance. The scheme was introduced in the academic year 
1999/2000, with the first applications submitted by teachers in July 2000.  
Prior to the introduction of the PRP scheme, all teachers were paid on a unified 
basic salary scale, which had nine full points, ranging from £14,658 – £23,193 per annum 
(2000 prices). An individual’s position on the scale depended on his/her qualifications 
                                                  
2 Performance related pay for teachers is not a new idea. During the second half of the nineteenth century 
teachers in English state secondary schools were paid according to students’ exam results, but this was 
abandoned because it was believed to reward teachers who concentrated on more able pupils (Hood et al 
1999). Formal systems of performance related pay (PRP) were not used in state schools during most of the 
twentieth century.   10 
and experience, and teachers usually progressed up the scale in annual increments. In 
addition to the basic salary, there were management, excellence, or recruitment and 
retention points (School Teachers’ Review Body 2000). In 1999/2000, about 75% of 
teachers were at the top of this scale, at spine point 9.  
After the reforms, teachers at spine point 9 could apply to pass the Performance 
Threshold. Passing the Threshold has two effects. First, it gives teachers an annual bonus 
of £2,000, payable without revision until the end of their career and included in 
calculations of pensionable salary. It is therefore of significant lifetime value. Second, 
once over the Threshold, teachers move onto a new Upper Pay Scale (UPS), which 
comprises additional increments, each of which are also related to performance
3.  
To pass the Threshold, individual teachers had to demonstrate that they had 
reached acceptable standards in five areas: knowledge and understanding of teaching; 
teaching management and assessment; wider professional effectiveness; professional 
characteristics; and pupil progress (DfEE 2000). In the area of pupil progress, the focus 
of our evaluation, the Threshold application form gave teachers the following instruction:  
“Please summarise evidence that as a result of your teaching your pupils achieve 
well relative to their prior attainment, making progress as good or better than 
similar pupils nationally. This should be shown in marks or grades in any 
relevant national tests or examinations, or school based assessment for pupils 
where national tests and examinations are not taken” (DfEE 2000). 
                                                  
3 In 2000 the UPS comprised five spine points; this has since been reduced to three 
(www.teachernet.gov.uk provides more information).   11 
Teachers were required to complete their application forms by July 2000, 
demonstrating their performance in each of the five areas. The information provided did 
not necessarily just cover the year 1999/2000 but could be based on the teacher’s career 
to that point. Passing the Threshold was largely about rewarding historical performance, 
and so cannot be considered true performance pay. However, passing did give access to 
the Upper Pay Scale which does offer conventional pay performance pay.  
80 per cent of eligible teachers applied. Headteachers then assessed each 
application and recommended whether or not individual teachers should pass the 
Threshold. Each school was then audited by an external assessor. Teachers who didn’t 
pass had limited rights of appeal. Performance Threshold payments were funded out of a 
separate budget, administered by central government, with no limit or quota on the 
number of teachers allowed to obtain these payments
4. 
Progressing up the UPS was similarly focussed on “sustained and substantial 
performance”, and Headteachers were required to conduct a performance review before 
awarding a pay increase.  
 Wragg et al (2001) conducted a survey of a random sample of 1000 schools in 
order to investigate this process. They found that in these schools, 88 percent of the 
eligible teachers applied, and of these, 97 percent were awarded the bonus. This very high 
figure influences the interpretation of the scheme. It suggests that, ex post, the initial 
Threshold operated more as a general pay increase for (almost) all teachers at the eligible 
point of the scale. Clearly, an unconditional pay increase will have little impact on 
                                                  
4 See Croxson and Atkinson (2001a, b) for an analysis of headteachers’ views on both the implementation 
and the impact of the Performance Threshold.   12 
teacher effort, though it may help staff retention rates. In fact, evidence from Marsden 
(2000) suggests that ex ante it was seen by a majority of teachers as a real incentive 
scheme, and not as a general pay rise. Marsden (2000) reports on his survey of teachers 
taken after the Performance Threshold was announced, but before it was implemented. 
Two particular questions on the questionnaire are relevant to us:  






“The Green Paper pay system is a device to 
avoid paying more money to all teachers” 
9  18  68 
“In practice, many excellent teachers will not 
pass the Threshold because there is certain to 
be a quota on places available” 
3  8  82 
Source, Marsden. D (2000), p. 4 
Sample size is c. 3000. 
 
This suggests that a substantial majority of teachers were expecting the scheme to 
be ‘real’ – that is, for only some teachers to be awarded the bonus. Given this, we should 
expect to see an impact on effort for eligible teachers. This impact should be reinforced 
by the forward-looking element of the scheme, the Upper Pay Scale, progress up which is 
dependent on additional assessments of individual teacher performance. 
 
4 Evaluation Methodology 
In this section we set out the model and evaluation methodology. Pupils are 
indexed i, teachers j, and teaching cycle (data tranche) t. Denote the pupil’s test score by 
g, value added by v, pupil ability by Z and pupil effort by e. Teacher effectiveness is X, 
performance pay eligibility is I, and experience is W. School effects on test scores are 
denoted S, a common time effect is T (for example, due to changes in testing) and test   13 
score noise is u.  Teacher effectiveness combines the effects of ability, effort and 
experience: 
( ) jt jt j jt W f b I b X 1 + + = b             (1) 
The term bj captures individual teacher heterogeneity in ability and core effort, 
and f(.)  is an increasing function. The pupil’s test score outcome is determined as 
follows: 
t j i i j i i t j i T S X e Z g ) ( ) ( 3 2 1 ) ( u g g g + + + + + =         (2) 
It seems likely that there are strong interactions between pupil effort and teacher 
effectiveness – better teachers eliciting more pupil effort, and hard working pupils 
encouraging more teacher preparation. These multiplier effects are included in the 
parameters g2 and g3. Substituting from (1) into (2) and computing the teacher mean 
score,  jt g : 
( ) T S W f b I b e Z g jt jt j j j jt + + + + + + = 1 3 3 3 2 1 g b g g g g     (3) 
where the upper bar denotes averaging over pupils taught by teacher j, and we 
assume that mean testing noise for a teacher is zero,  ( ) 0 = jt Eu . Taking the difference 
between the two tranches for teacher j yields:  
( ) ( ) T W f b I e Z g j j j j j D + D + D + D + D = D 1 3 3 2 1 g b g g g      (4) 
where D denotes differencing between tranches. The change in the teacher’s mean 
performance depends on differences in the pupils assigned to her, whether she increased 
her effort due to the incentive scheme, her gain in experience and any common time   14 
shocks. Note that the fixed teacher ability term has dropped out, as has the school effect. 
Finally, we compare the expected value of (4) for eligible teachers (DI = 1) and ineligible 
teachers (DI = 0). With D denoting differencing expected values across eligibility status, 
( ) ( ) W f D b e D Z D g D D + + D + D = D 1 3 3 2 1 g b g g g       (5) 
This is the difference-in-difference. Assuming that the experimental design allows 
us to set  ( ) 0 2 1 = D + D e D Z D E g g  (which we discuss below), this yields 
( ) W f D b g D D + = D 1 3 3 g b g . The parameter of interest is g3b, the impact of eligibility for 
the scheme on teacher effort and hence on pupil test scores. We can recover this directly 
from the difference-in-difference estimates if f(.) is linear, and the second term therefore 
disappears. If f(.) is concave, then  g DD underestimates g3b. We discuss this further 
below. 
The other main outcome variable we use is value-added, v. Pupil value added 
depends on their effort, their teacher’s effectiveness, school and time effects and testing 
noise: 
  t j i i j i t j i T S X e v ) ( ) ( 2 1 ) ( v m m + + + + =          (6) 
Following the same procedure as above yields the value-added difference-in-
difference: 
( ) ( ) W f D b e D v D D + + D = D 1 2 2 1 m b m m         (7) 
We can now address the plausibility of our assumptions that 
( ) 0 2 1 = D + D e D Z D E g g  for test scores and  ( ) 0 1 = De D E m  for value-added. There is a   15 
strong reason for believing that the latter holds. Pupils in England are either grouped into 
classes on test outcomes, or they are not systematically grouped at all. They are not 
grouped on effort, so no classes are created based on effort. Also, the timing of the 
incentive scheme makes it highly unlikely that schools would be able to differentially 
assign classes to eligible teachers, given that successful applications for the initial 
Threshold were largely based on performance data from classes allocated prior to the 
PRP scheme being introduced. So we argue that the value added results are free from any 
assignment bias, and that the test score results are highly likely to be. In fact, any 
difference between the results for the two outcome measures is an indication of potential 
ability-based differential class assignment between eligible and ineligible teachers.  
We present results for the difference-in-difference estimates in (5) and (7). As 
noted, these include the effect of differential experience gain. The nature of the incentive 
scheme means that ineligible teachers were necessarily less experienced than their 
eligible colleagues. If f(.) is concave, then DDf(W) will not drop out of the difference-in-
difference. We also therefore estimate regression equations for (4) and the value-added 
equivalent, controlling for measures of experience.  
In fact, our data allow us to differentiate outcomes by subject – English, maths 
and science – and so we compute (5) and (7) separately by subject. This is useful since it 
addresses spillover effects between teachers. For example, an incentivised teacher might 
set a lot of homework, thus cutting students’ time for other subjects and potentially 
reducing those other scores. Within subject such a spillover is not possible – if a student 
has two maths teachers for example, the single maths score is attributed to both. We do   16 
not have enough data to run the regressions controlling for experience by subject, but 
pool over subjects and include subject dummies.  
 
5 Data 
The performance pay system introduced in 1999 combined the Performance 
Threshold (PT) and the Upper Pay Scale (UPS). For each cohort of teachers, the former 
offers a substantial pay rise following a successful application, and a gateway to the UPS, 
which offers a series of performance-related pay increments. We analyse the performance 
of a sample of teachers who were eligible for the performance pay system when it was 
introduced in September 1999. By focussing on eligibility as opposed to application, we 
sidestep the problem faced by researchers using the South Carolina scheme of likely 
differential application rates (Cooper and Cohn, 1997, and Boozer, 1999). As noted 
above, in this scheme almost all eligible applied, and almost all who applied were 
successful, so almost all the teachers in our eligible group faced both the PT and the UPS. 
Thus we compare the ineligible and those passing the PT and placed on the UPS.  
We use data on pupils’ performance in the two-year GCSE teaching cycle before 
the system was introduced – our first (control) tranche runs from September 1997 to June 
1999. For the treatment period, we take the first teaching cycle that excludes the PT 
monitoring year for our sample of teachers (September 1999 to June 2000), since success 
at the PT was based on historical data, and the UPS provides a conventional performance 
incentive. Thus our second tranche runs September 2000 to June 2002. The timeline in 
Appendix Figure 1 sets this out in detail.    17 
 
(a) Data requirements 
The first key feature of the data is to control for pupil prior attainment and 
measure value-added. The UK education assessment and information system provides a 
number of opportunities to measure this. In this paper we examine value added between 
the Key Stage 3 (KS3) exams at age 14 and the GCSE exams at age 16. Key Stage exams 
are taken in English, Maths and Science; pupils also have to take GCSE exams in these 
subjects (among others). The choice of the GSCE – KS3 gain is for several reasons. First, 
students are mainly taught by the same teacher(s) for a particular subject throughout that 
period. Second, the gap between exams is shorter than the five-year cycle between KS2 
exams at 11 and GCSE exams at 16. As measuring value added requires school records 
for all years in which exams are taken, a shorter focus period is easier to undertake. 
Third, the GCSE exams are important for students as they are the crucial gateway 
qualifications for higher education and for the employment prospects of those who leave 
school at 16. Fourth, the GCSE exams are the headline component of published school 
performance tables.  They are thus nationally set and marked high-stakes exams for both 
pupils and for schools.  
The second key feature is the longitudinal element, following the same teachers 
through complete KS3 – GCSE teaching cycles, one before and one during the scheme. A 
detailed timeline is given in Appendix Figure 1. The scheme was introduced in the 
academic year 1999/2000, with eligibility defined in September 1999, and the first forms 
submitted in July 2000. The ‘before’ (tranche 1) data relate to the teaching cycle from 
September 1997 through June 1999, when the GCSE exams are taken; the prior   18 
attainment measure is the KS3 score from June 1997. The ‘after’ (tranche 2) data are 
three years later, starting September 2000 to June 2002, with KS3 scores from June 2000. 
Teachers are tagged as eligible if they were on spine point 9 in September 1999.  The 
evaluation design requires data that links teachers to individual pupils, before and during 
the scheme.  As students may be taught by a number of teachers in the two class years 
between KS3 and GCSE, to create the teacher average requires that pupils be matched to 
teachers for both these years, in each of the two teaching cycles.
5   
 The data linking pupils to teachers are class lists, which are held only by schools. 
Schools therefore were approached directly initially in 2000, and invited to participate in 
the study. They were told at this point that they would have to provide data for two 
cohorts of pupils: those who followed the GCSE syllabus between 1997 and 1999 (the 
‘before’ data) and those who followed the GCSE syllabus between 2000 and 2002 (the 
‘after’ data). The data we requested from each participating school are summarised in 
Table 1. The information covers 2 tranches of students: those who took their GCSEs in 
1998/9 and those who took them in 2001/02. For each tranche, we requested the student’s 
GCSE and KS3 scores in English, maths and science plus other pupil characteristics 
including date of birth, gender and home postcode (zip code). From files on teachers we 
requested information on teacher characteristics, including pay spine point, salary and 
threshold eligibility, and gender. The pupil and teacher data were matched at teacher 
level.  
To measure pupil progress and account for prior attainment, we compute value-
added as the residual from regressing pupil GCSE score against KS3 score and gender 
                                                  
5 Students do not generally repeat years between KS3 and GCSE.   19 
within our dataset, combining both tranches of data. We did this subject by subject, and 
also the pupil’s average GCSE score against average KS3 score. We have experimented 
with other functional forms, but this straightforward linear model typically works well6.  
(b) Sample representativeness 
These data demands on schools were quite onerous. In fact, relatively few schools 
keep class list data from one year to the next (the software system used by many schools 
overwrites the class lists each new academic year). Thus provision of data on class lists 
back to 1996/7 in 2000 was not possible for many schools. In addition, teacher turnover is 
high, meaning that much of the data provided could not be used to provide estimates of 
value added. Our final sample uses data from 18 schools, covering 182 teachers and 
almost 23,000 pupils. This is a low acceptance rate from schools, but is a function of the 
high data demands of the evaluation. Details of our approach to schools are given in 
Appendix 1.   
There can be no presumption that this sample is representative of all secondary 
schools.  In terms of unobservables, the schools that did participate were more likely to 
have good performance management and IT systems as schools without good IT systems 
could not typically provide the required class lists.  
We also undertook in-depth qualitative interviews with participating school to 
establish, inter alia, the view of the head-teacher on the scheme and its operation within 
their school.  It is not the case that all the participating schools were keen proponents of 
                                                  
6 The measure of value added used by the Department for Education and Skills normalises value-added to 
have mean zero at each KS3 level, but we did not want to impose this feature on our data.   20 
the reform.  There was a range of views, illustrated by the following quotes (see Atkinson 
and Croxson (2001a, b) for further details and analysis): 
 “So I'm not opposed to performance-related pay, per se … the notion of reward 
for good behaviour, that's how you motivate children I think. And I don't think 
adults are any different.” 
“I personally am a supporter of performance-related pay. But I do have some 
major misgivings about the Threshold Assessment component of it. Because my 
personal view is that isn’t performance pay …the system that exists at the moment 
I feel doesn’t discriminate adequately enough. It’s discriminatory measure is: is 
the teacher competent or is the teacher incompetent? For example, you know, if 
the outcomes of your last evaluation from OFSTED are that your teaching is 
unsatisfactory then clearly you wouldn’t go for a threshold. If you’re under 
current competency procedures then you wouldn’t go for the threshold. But other 
than that it’s hard to see who isn’t going beyond the threshold. Because 
everybody seems to be.” 
 “I don’t think the Performance Threshold is anything other, if I’m being crudely 
honest, to sum it as being an interesting political way of giving teachers 2000 
quid on the basis they’re probably Labour voters.”  
Data on the performance of pupils in the sample, presented in Table 3, show a 
general increase in KS3, GCSE and value added scores across all subjects from tranche 1 
(1997/9) to tranche 2 (2000/02).  The exception is the maths value added score, which 
decreased.  Table 4 uses national data from the Department for Education and Skills 
(DfES) to compare the exam performance of the sample with performance at national   21 
level. Generally, the over time changes for each pupil output measure for the sample do 
not match the nationwide picture closely.  Between the 2 tranches, there was a nationwide 
increase of 0.12 average KS3 points, a slight decrease in average GCSE score and no 
change in value added.  The sample data shows an increase of 0.05 KS3 and 0.14 GCSE 
points, as well as an increase in value added over the period.  As noted above, the sample 
contains schools with better data archives than average, which may be used for 
performance management. The bigger test score gains in the sample may reflect this, or 
may indicate that schools interested in raising school achievement chose to participate.  
The sample of schools is not, therefore, very representative of the national picture 
in terms of value added and GCSE scores. However, the implications for the sample of 
teachers is less clear, and teachers are the unit of observation. There are 182 teachers in 
our estimation sample. Of these, 1 has missing eligibility data, 36 were not eligible for 
performance related pay and 145 were eligible. Thus in our core analysis when we split 
by eligibility status we have 181 observations, but in the summary tables on overall 
scores, we report all 182. A summary of the teacher characteristics for the two groups is 
presented in Table 2 (the number of teachers with the relevant data are in brackets). 
Eligible teachers are on average, older and more experienced than the not eligible 
teachers, which we would expect given the nature of the program.  Average KS3 scores 
across the 2 tranches are higher for eligible teachers, indicating that these teachers teach 
more able pupils at age 14 (KS3).  
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6 Results 
We present results in three parts: first, overall teacher level outcomes; second, the 
difference-in-difference analysis; third, regression analysis, and finally we provide an 
interpretation. We briefly consider the potential for gaming of the scheme. Throughout, 
we report weighted results, where the weights adjust for the number of pupils taught by a 
teacher (unweighted results are available from the authors).  
(a) Teacher level outcomes 
We begin by describing the overall pattern of exam results at teacher-tranche 
level, across the two two-year teaching cycles, split by the three subjects: English, maths 
and science.  Denote gi as pupil i’s GCSE score in a particular subject. Denote J1 as the 
set of pupils taught by teacher j in tranche 1(numbering nj1), and equivalently J2 and nj2 
in tranche 2. We compute teacher-tranche level summary statistics as the mean over all 
pupils taught by a given teacher in a given two-year cycle
7.  That is, teacher-tranche mean 





















˛ ˛ = =           (8) 
The teacher level change in GCSE performance is given by: 
1 2 j j j g g g - = D               (9) 
the empirical counter-part to (4). Similarly, we define  j j j v v v D and , 1 2 based on 
pupil i’s value added, vi.  
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The simple GCSE results in table 5 show an overall increase in mean GCSE 
scores for our teachers.  The quantiles show that this was not universal and that some 
teachers had  considerable falls in GCSE scores between the two cycles.  These patterns 
are clear in the subject specific results as well. 
Table 6 analyses value-added.  There is an overall increase in value-added 
between the two dates, and in English and science, but not in maths.  Again there is 
considerable dispersion of the levels of teacher mean VA, and also of teacher level 
changes in mean VA.  For example, adding over all subjects, the biggest fall in VA is  
1.58, equivalent to moving from the median VA (-0.01 in tranche 2) to the minimum (-
1.57 tranche 2).  The biggest improvement is of a similar scale. As these are value-added 
outcomes, they do not depend on the particular set of pupils assigned to a teacher.  This 
suggests considerable cycle-to-cycle variability in teacher production of value-added. 
Indeed, remarkably the change in VA for a given teacher over time is as variable 
(standard deviation of 0.58) as the difference between teachers in VA within a tranche 
(standard deviation of 0.55).  
(b) Difference in difference analysis 
Figures 1 and 2 present the distribution of teacher-level GCSE and VA changes, 
split by subject and by teacher eligibility status. Each panel shows a kernel estimate of 
the density of the outcome variable (GCSE or VA) separately for each tranche. Some of 
the plots are based on relatively small numbers of teachers.  
Focussing on the GCSE plots across all subjects (the top row of Figure 1), we see 
differences across eligibility status: for eligible teachers, there is some evidence of a 
rightward shift of the whole distribution in tranche 2, whereas the increase in mean GCSE   24 
for ineligibles arises from a large reduction in low GCSE scores. These patterns are not 
universal across subjects. The weighted VA plots across all subjects (the top row of 
Figure 2) reflect a fairly similar pattern – a general rightward shift for eligibles, but a 
change only in the lower half of the distribution for ineligibles.  
The mean increases in scores across teaching cycles and eligibility status can be 
seen in Table 7, along with some details of the distribution.  Comparing the distribution 
of GCSE  changes across eligible and ineligible teachers, we see that the former raised 
their GCSE scores by 0.21 on average and the latter by 0.13. Regressing the change in 
GCSE between the two tranches against the eligibility dummy shows the difference-in-
difference of 0.08 to be insignificantly different from zero. Looking at other parts of the 
distribution, we see that there are significant positive differences in the differences at the 
lower quartile and the median, while the upper quartiles of the distributions show a bigger 
gain for ineligibles
8. These are suggestive of a rightward shift in the lower and middle 
parts of the distribution of GCSE differences for the eligible teachers. By subject, the 
difference-in-difference results reveal a larger increase in mean GCSE scores for 
ineligible teachers in maths and English; this is reversed in science. None of the subject 
difference-in-difference estimates are significantly different from zero. 
The pattern across the distribution shows considerable variation over time in 
performance for a lot of teachers, illustrated in Figure 3. This plots for each teacher, 
her/his mean GCSE score in tranche 1 on the horizontal axis against the equivalent in 
tranche 2 on the vertical axis. Changes in performance therefore appear as deviations 
from the 45
o line, and eligibles and ineligibles are separately identified. Overall, there is a 
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greater concentration of ineligible teachers near or above the 45
0 line relative to those 
who are eligible. We also break down the performance of teachers over the two tranches 
by subject, with the largest variation appearing in maths.   
However, the GCSE results depend in part on the pupils assigned to teachers in 
schools.  Our main focus is on VA. Figure 4 plots the comparison across the two tranches 
for eligible and ineligible teachers. Again we see the considerable variation in teacher 
performance between teaching cycles. The graph also shows no obviously greater 
improvement for eligible teachers. Table 8 confirms this impression: VA increases 
slightly more for eligible than ineligible teachers, though not significantly so.  Again 
considering other parts of the distribution, the lower quartile of the distribution of 
differences is significantly higher for eligibles, with no significant difference at the 
median or upper quartile. As with GCSE, this suggests greater impact of the scheme in 
the lower half of the distribution. Looking at individual subjects, the difference-in-
difference is positive in both English and science, but much larger and negative in maths.  
The overall difference-in-difference estimate is small and positive, but insignificantly 
different from zero (note that the estimates for science (positive) and maths (negative) are 
significantly different from zero). 
The results so far suggest no clear difference between eligible and ineligible 
teachers. In terms of overall value-added there is a very small and insignificantly positive 
effect, arising from positive effects in science and English, and negative in maths.  
However, as noted above, the difference-in-difference estimates under-estimate the 
impact of the incentive scheme if the experience-effectiveness profile f(W) is concave. 
We now turn to parameterising teacher experience.   26 
(c) Regression Analysis 
The difference-in-difference estimates control for teacher effects, (implicitly 
school effects) and pupils’ prior attainment.  What they do not control for, however, is the 
systematic difference in experience between eligible and non-eligible teachers arising 
from the nature of the performance pay scheme.  If there is a positive and concave 
experience-effectiveness relationship, we can only identify the impact of the incentive 
scheme by controlling for differences in experience.  
There is insufficient data to characterise a continuous experience-effectiveness 
schedule.  We do know an individual’s spine point, age and years spent at the current 
school, but not their total teaching experience.  The pay spine point is the best summary 
of experience as teachers are rewarded for experience by movement up the pay scale.  
Figures 5 and 6 plots this against teacher mean GCSE and VA outcomes.  It is clear that 
the mass of data at spine point 9 – the eligible set – makes it difficult to describe a clear 
relationship of outcomes with experience.  It also makes it difficult to separately identify 
eligibility and experience.  
An alternative to a smooth profile is to isolate new teachers and separate out any 
substantial gains they may achieve by moving up a learning curve.  We define a novice 
teacher dummy, equal to 1 if the teacher is at spine point 5 or below in the first tranche.  
We also define a leadership dummy, equal to 1 if the teacher is a deputy head or head 
teacher.   27 
Regression results for a variety of specifications of experience are shown in Table 
9 for GCSE and Table 10 for VA
9. The unit of observation is a teacher, and the dependent 
variable is the teacher’s change in GCSE score (respectively VA) between the two 
tranches. A full set of school dummies is included, as are two subject dummies. Taking 
Table 9 first, the first three columns illustrate the difficulty of trying to separately identify 
eligibility and spine point as a general measure of experience. Comparing columns 1 and 
2, we see that the inclusion of the eligibility dummy makes the spine point variable much 
more negative – it almost doubles in size. The eligibility dummy itself is reasonably big 
(and positive) but not significant. Dropping the spine point variable pushes the eligibility 
dummy close to zero. In other words, high collinearity between eligibility and spine point 
makes it impossible to isolate any experience effect through the spine point variable. Our 
preferred specification is in column 4, in which we pick up the effect of experience 
through the “novice teacher” dummy. This is large and significantly positive. Its 
inclusion also yields a positive and sizeable eligibility effect, which is significant at 5%. 
Of the other variables, “years in school” is always zero (conditional on the other 
variables), and “leadership” role is positive but not significant. As expected, given that 
we have differenced out teacher effects, the gender of the teacher appears not to matter a 
great deal. We discuss the quantitative significance of the eligibility coefficient below.  
The regression results for VA are shown in Table 10.  These tell a very similar 
story. The change in coefficients between columns 1 to 3 again reflects the high 
correlation between eligibility and spine point. In column 4, we see that the novice 
dummy is significantly positive and that eligibility is large and positive with a t-statistic 
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of 2.66. Years in school, leadership role and teacher gender again have no effect. The 
consistent drop in VA in maths is clear. 
In Table 11 we allow for the effect of eligibility to vary between subjects, 
reporting specifications equivalent to column 4 in Tables 9 and 10. This is suggested by 
the difference-in-difference findings above. We see that for GCSE, the eligibility dummy 
is positive and well-defined. The interaction with the maths subject dummy is negative 
and of similar size, but not significant. In the case of VA, the eligibility coefficient is 
positive and now well-defined10. Again, the maths interaction is equal and opposite in 
sign, and this time is significant. The sample of maths teachers is not different in terms of 
observables to the other subject teachers – very similar age and experience patterns and a 
gender ratio between English and science. 
We are interested to see whether the incentive scheme had a constant impact 
across the ability range, or had differential impacts. To get at this, we compute for each 
teacher the difference between the kth percentile of the outcome distribution for tranche 2 
and subtract from that the k
th percentile of the outcome distribution for tranche 1. So this 
is not the difference in mean performance for each teacher, but the difference in 
performance across the distribution. We do this for k = 10, 25, 50, 75 and 90. We regress 
these outcome differences against eligibility and the other variables as in the previous 
Table. The results in Table 12 simply report the eligibility coefficient. There is no clear 
overall pattern in this for GCSE, but for VA the coefficient is considerably higher (by 
about a third) at the bottom two points than higher up. This suggests that the incentive 
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eligibility status in the GCSE regression rises from 0.437 to 0.440 with clustering against a coefficient of 
1.339, and in the VA regression it rises from 0.180 to 0.205 with a coefficient of 0.653.   29 
scheme had greater impact on raising scores among low achievers, possibly because 
teachers concentrated their efforts where they thought easier gains were to be made. 
While this may be related to ceiling effects (see next section), the fact that it appears in 
the bottom quarter suggests there is a real effect too.  
(d) Robustness checks 
We use the novice teacher dummy to capture the experience profile and identify 
the effect of the scheme. To check our degree of reliance on the novice dummy, we 
instead drop all novices from the estimation and re-estimate. In this case, identification 
comes from a comparison of eligible and non-eligible teachers with a similar level of 
experience. The first two columns of Table 13 show that this makes a marginal difference 
to our results: the estimated impacts of eligibility are in fact marginally higher at 1.389 
for GCSE and is 0.786 for VA, compared to 1.339 and 0.653 in Table 11
11. This is 
reassuring that the use of the novice teacher dummy is not too restrictive. 
A second problem may be the presence of ceiling effects in test scores. Both in 
GCSE and more particularly VA, there is an upper limit to the grade a student can be 
awarded, and therefore to the progress that they can be measured to make in our measure 
of VA. This problem will differ between classes depending on ability distribution, and so 
might affect the score gain that we attribute to the scheme. One simple way to deal with 
this is to consider the bottom 75% of the pupil distribution only (the bottom 75% of the 
initial KS3 distribution), and we report the results in columns 3 and 4 of Table 13. They 
show similar coefficients on eligibility status, slightly lower than in Table 11.  
                                                  
11 Note that the interaction with English is now significantly negative.   30 
(e) Gaming 
The obvious way that a school could try to help its teachers succeed would be to 
assign them classes in which they could more easily demonstrate above-average pupil 
progress. In fact, the timing of the start of the school year and the deadline for the 
submission of applications mean that this is very unlikely. Applications for the initial 
Threshold, submitted in July 2000, were largely based on performance data from classes 
allocated prior to the announcement of the PRP scheme, so differential allocation of 
classes between eligible and non-eligible teachers in our ‘before’ data does is not a 
credible gaming strategy. Also, our data suggest little change in class assignment between 
the two tranches – the mean KS3 average of pupils taught by eligible teachers rose from 
5.167 in tranche 1 to 5.290 in tranche (a difference of 0.123), and from 4.989 to 5.191 for 
ineligibles (0.202). These are both small changes, and the difference between them is 
only around 1.5% of the tranche 1 scores. There is no support here for systematic changes 
in class assignment. There is some evidence that Headteachers did help with filling in the 
paperwork (Wragg et al 2001), but this will have no effect on pupil test scores in national 
exams.  
(f) Evaluation 
We evaluate the size of the coefficient on eligibility status in two ways. Both 
GCSE and VA changes are in the same metric of GCSE points (the latter is just a residual 
of the former), and one point is the difference between a grade (an ‘A’ and a ‘B’ for 
example). As we have seen above (Tables 5 and 6), one standard deviation in the teacher-
mean change in GCSE is 1.29 and for VA is 0.58. We can compare these to the 
coefficients on eligibility of 0.890 for GCSE change (Table 9, column 4) and 0.422 for   31 
VA change (Table 10, column 4); as percentages of a standard deviation these are 69% 
and 73% respectively. In terms of straightforward grades, the estimates suggest that the 
scheme added on average almost half a grade of VA per child for eligible teachers. These 
are substantial effects in high-stakes exams: GCSEs are the gateway exams into higher 
education. It makes no sense to incorporate these results into a cost-benefit analysis of the 
scheme, since we only capture the incentivisation aspect here and not the recruitment and 
retention aspect.  
An alternative way of thinking about the impact of the scheme is to note that the 
eligibility dummy is about 67% of the size of the novice teacher dummy for GCSE 
change, and 78% for VA change. Thus the incentive scheme can be thought of as eliciting 
extra effort equivalent to about three-quarters of the effect of young teachers moving up 
the learning curve. 
It would be of interest to distinguish between those among the eligible who passed 
the Threshold, and so reached the UPS, and those who did not. In practice, this is not 
possible. As we noted above, nationally 97% of the eligible passed the Threshold, so a 
distinction between the groups is largely impossible. In our dataset, information on 
whether a teacher passed is missing for some teachers, so we are unable to confirm this 
figure for our sample. It seems very likely that almost all of these in fact passed the 
Threshold, and hence we cannot distinguish between those passing and those not.  
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7 Conclusion 
This paper evaluates the impact of a performance-related pay system for teachers 
in England. Using teacher level data, matched with pupil test scores and value-added, we 
test whether the introduction of a payment based on pupil attainment increased teacher 
effort. Our evaluation design controls for pupil effects, school effects and teacher effects, 
and adopts a difference-in-difference methodology.  
We find that the scheme did improve test score gains, on average by about half a 
grade per pupil. We also found heterogeneity across subject teachers, with maths teachers 
showing no improvement. A caveat is the necessity, given our data, to define the 
experience-effectiveness profile in quite a parametric way. Nevertheless, our results add 
to the very small literature on individual teacher-based performance pays schemes, 
evaluated in the context of a robust research design. The results show that teachers do 
respond to direct financial incentives. In an incentive scheme strongly based on pupil 
progress, test scores improved. Whether this represented extra effort or effort diverted 
from other professional activities is not something we can determine in our dataset. But 
our results suggest that teacher-based performance pay is a policy tool that education 
authorities should consider as part of their drive to raise educational performance.   
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Table 1: Data Requested 
 
Information   Level 
Class lists for year 10 in 1997/8 and year 11 in 1998/9, 
with pupil identifiers and teacher identifiers 
pupil 
Class lists for year 10 in 2000/1 and year 11 in 2001/2, 
with pupil identifiers and teacher identifiers 
pupil 
Pupil test/exam scores for Key Stage 3 in 1996/7 and 
GCSE 1998/9, for all English, maths and science subjects, 
with pupil identifiers 
pupil 
Pupil test/exam scores for Key Stage 3 in 1999/00 and 
GCSE 2001/02, for all English, maths and science 
subjects, with pupil identifiers 
pupil 
Supplementary information for each pupil: date of birth, 
gender, postcode. With pupil identifier 
pupil 
Teachers characteristics at 1 September 1999: age, gender, 
salary, experience, spine point, whether applied for PT. 
With teacher identifier 
teacher 
Information about school policy: exam boards used, 
streaming/setting policy, pre-existing performance 
management system 
school 
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Table 2: Summary teacher statistics 
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Table 3: Summary pupil statistics 
 
  Tranche 1  Tranche 2 
Pupil Characteristics 
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Table 4: Comparative Summary statistics for National and Estimation 
data sets 
 
    National 
 
      Estimation   
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Source: Department for Education and Skills 
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Table 5: GCSE scores: overall and by subject 
 
Overall                   
        Percentiles   
Tranche  
Sample 
Size  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Min  25
th  50
th  75
th  Max 
Output 
Measure 
1  182  4.82  1.33  1.08  3.92  4.90  5.62  7.74  GCSE 
2  182  5.02  1.23  1.62  4.18  5.04  5.85  7.79  GCSE 
                   
Difference  182  0.19  1.29  -3.62  -0.57  0.10  0.77  4.05  GCSE 
 
 
English                   
1  58  4.93  1.26  1.42  4.10  4.95  5.86  7.74  GCSE 
2  58  5.13  1.28  2.00  4.50  5.22  5.89  7.65  GCSE 
                   
Difference  58  0.20  1.25  -2.54  -0.64  0.07  0.77  4.05  GCSE 
 
 
Science                    
1  74  4.91  1.26  1.08  4.31  4.96  5.58  7.39  GCSE 
2  74  5.11  1.11  2.89  4.48  4.97  5.90  7.33  GCSE 
                   
Difference  74  0.20  1.18  -2.37  -0.33  0.10  0.36  3.68  GCSE 
 
 
Maths                   
1  50  4.51  1.53  1.33  3.41  4.59  5.88  7.63  GCSE 
2  50  4.68  1.40  1.62  3.47  4.73  5.73  7.79  GCSE 
                   
Difference  50  0.17  1.58  -3.62  -0.84  0.10  1.36  3.70  GCSE 
Unit is a teacher 
Means are weighted by number of pupils per teacher, averaged over two tranches 
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Table 6: Value Added Scores: overall and by subject 
 
                   
Overall        Percentiles   
Tranche  
Sample 
Size  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Min  25
th  50
th  75
th  Max 
Output 
Measure 
1  182  -0.07  0.55  -1.93  -0.45  -0.10  0.34  1.38  Value added 
2  182  0.05  0.56  -1.57  -0.35  -0.01  0.51  1.50  Value added 
                   
Difference  182  0.12  0.58  -1.58  -0.18  0.09  0.42  2.03  Value added 
 
 
English                   
1  58  0.29  0.54  -1.93  0.02  0.34  0.69  1.38  Value added 
2  58  0.40  0.51  -0.67  0.04  0.49  0.72  1.50  Value added 
                   
Difference  58  0.11  0.71  -1.13  -0.49  0.15  0.56  2.03  Value added 
 
 
Science                    
1  74  -0.10  0.45  -1.29  -0.43  -0.01  0.10  0.87  Value added 
2  74  0.11  0.45  -0.83  -0.29  0.06  0.51  0.90  Value added 
                   
Difference  74  0.21  0.44  -0.88  -0.05  0.16  0.38  1.43  Value added 
                   
 
 
Maths                   
1  50  -0.41  0.53  -1.42  -0.82  -0.43  -0.07  0.75  Value added 
2  50  -0.49  0.44  -1.57  -0.73  -0.52  -0.23  0.59  Value added 
                   
Difference  50  -0.08  0.64  -1.58  -0.50  0.02  0.32  1.92  Value added 
Unit is a teacher 
Means are weighted by number of pupils per teacher, averaged over two tranches 
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Table 7: Overall Weighted GCSE Means for Eligible and Not Eligible 
Teachers 
 
Overall                     
           Percentiles   
Tranche   Eligible 
Sample 
Size  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Min  25
th  50
th  75
th  Max 
Output 
Measure 
1  Yes  145  4.84  1.30  1.33  3.99  4.90  5.58  7.74  GCSE 
2  Yes  145  5.05  1.28  1.62  4.12  5.12  5.90  7.79    
Difference        0.21  1.24  -3.62  -0.29  0.16  0.75  4.05    
1  No  36  4.78  1.50  1.08  3.81  5.26  5.71  6.90  GCSE 
2  No  36  4.91  1.05  2.33  4.30  4.71  5.73  7.08    
Difference        0.13  1.53  -1.91  -0.88  -0.64  1.23  3.70    
                     
Difference 
in 
Difference       
0.08 






(0.38)    
1. standard error in brackets 
 
Table 7a: Weighted GCSE Means for Eligible and Not Eligible English 
Teachers 
 
English                     
                     
           Percentiles    
Tranche   Eligible 
Sample 
Size  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Min  25
th  50
th  75
th  Max 
Output 
Measure 
1  Yes  47  4.91   1.28  1.42  4.10  4.95  5.54  7.74  GCSE 
2  Yes  47  5.10  1.34  2.00  4.12  5.22  5.93  7.65    
Difference        0.19  1.22  -2.54  -0.34  0.12  0.77  4.05    
1  No  11  5.01  1.25  3.00  4.58  5.52  6.04  6.39  GCSE 
2  No  11  5.25  1.00  3.21  4.71  5.38  5.88  7.08    
Difference        0.24  1.39  -1.21  -0.64  0.06  1.30  2.80    
                     
Difference 
in 
Difference       
-0.05 
(0.30)               
1.  standard error in brackets 
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Table 7b: Weighted GCSE Means for Eligible and Not Eligible Science 
Teachers 
 
Science                      
                     
          Percentiles    
Tranche   Eligible 
Sample 
Size  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Min  25
th  50
th  75
th  Max 
Output 
Measure 
1  Yes  59  4.91  1.22  1.92  4.31  4.96  5.43  7.39  GCSE 
2  Yes  59  5.19  1.11  2.89  4.64  5.15  5.90  7.33    
Difference        0.28  1.09  -2.37  -0.17  0.18  0.36  3.28    
1  No  14   4.91  1.51  1.08  4.36  5.26  5.62  6.90  GCSE 
2  No       14  4.77  1.20  3.14  3.90  4.48  4.92  6.95    
Difference        -0.14  1.54  -1.91  -0.88  -0.78  0.05  3.68    
                     
Difference 
in 
Difference       
0.42 
(0.25)               
1. standard error in brackets 
 
Table 7c: Weighted GCSE Means for Eligible and Not Eligible Maths 
Teachers 
 
Maths             
                     
           Percentiles    
Tranche   Eligible 
Sample 
Size  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Min  25
th  50
th  75
th  Max 
Output 
Measure 
1  Yes  39  4.57  1.49  1.33  3.45  4.59  5.88  7.63  GCSE 
2  Yes  39  4.63  1.50  1.62  3.40  4.73  5.96  7.79    
Difference        0.06  1.57  -3.62  -0.84  0.15  1.36  2.69    
1  No  11  4.27  1.73  2.12  2.33  3.88  5.71  6.79  GCSE 
2  No  11  4.85  0.99  2.33  4.20  4.67  5.73  6.04    
Difference        0.58  1.65  -1.72  -0.65  0.00  1.85  3.70    
                     
Difference 
in 
Difference       
-0.52 
(0.39)               
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Table 8: Overall weighted Value Added Means for Eligible and Not 
Eligible Teachers 
 
Overall                     
           Percentiles   
Tranche   Eligible 
Sample 
Size  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Min  25
th  50
th  75
th  Max 
Output 
Measure 
1  Yes  145  -0.08  0.54  -1.93  -0.46  -0.11  0.30  1.38 
Value 
added 
2  Yes  145  0.05  0.57  -1.57  -0.35  0.05  0.51  1.50    
Difference        0.13  0.56  -1.58  -0.13  0.16  0.42  2.03    
1  No  36  -0.04  0.62  -1.42  -0.39  -0.07  0.49  1.29 
Value 
added 
2  No  36  0.06  0.53  -0.89  -0.31  -0.07  0.59  1.25    
Difference        0.10  0.66  -1.12  -0.40  0.05  0.43  1.92    
                     
Difference 
in 
Difference       
0.03 






(0.12)     
1.  standard error in brackets 
 
 
Table 8a : Weighted Value Added Means for Eligible and Not Eligible 
English Teachers 
English                     
                     
          Percentiles   
Tranche   Eligible 
Sample 
Size  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Min  25
th  50
th  75
th  Max 
Output 
Measure 
1  Yes  47  0.27  0.53  -1.93  -0.02  0.34  0.57  1.38 
Value 
added 
2  Yes  47  0.39  0.51  -0.67  0.04  0.46  0.70  1.50    
Difference        0.12  0.69  -1.13  -0.31  0.16  0.55  2.03    
1  No  11  0.39  0.59  -0.64  -0.01  0.54  0.78  1.29 
Value 
added 
2  No  11  0.48  0.54  -0.31  -0.21  0.71  0.89  1.25    
Difference        0.09  0.83  -1.12  -0.57  -0.16  1.13  1.18    
                     
Difference 
in 
Difference       
0.03 
(0.17)               
1.  standard error in brackets 
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Table 8b : Weighted Value Added Means for Eligible and Not Eligible 
Science Teachers 
 
Science                      
                     
           Percentiles    
Tranche   Eligible 
Sample 
Size  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Min  25
th  50
th  75
th  Max 
Output 
Measure 
1  Yes  59  -0.11  0.46  -1.29 -0.52 -0.13 0.10  0.87 Value added 
2  Yes  59  0.14  0.45  -0.83 -0.26  0.18  0.51  0.90    
Difference        0.25  0.40  -0.82 -0.03  0.19  0.38  1.12    
1  No  14  -0.04  0.45  -1.03 -0.16 -0.09 0.10  0.82  Value added
2  No  14  0.01  0.44  -0.38 -0.38 -0.07 0.40  0.87  
Difference        0.05  0.60  -0.88 -0.32 -0.18 0.25  1.43    
                     
Difference 
in 
Difference       
0.20 
(0.09)*               
1.  standard error in brackets 
2.  * significant at the 5% level. 
 
Table 8c : Weighted Value Added Means for Eligible and Not Eligible 
Maths Teachers 
 
Maths             
                     
          Percentiles   
Tranche   Eligible 
Sample 
Size  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Min  25
th  50
th  75
th  Max 
Output 
Measure 
1  Yes  39  -0.39  0.50  -1.39  -0.75  -0.34  -0.07  0.75 
Value 
added 
2  Yes  39  -0.54  0.43  -1.57  -0.76  -0.61  -0.30  0.38    
Difference        -0.15  0.62  -1.58  -0.64  -0.02  0.32  0.89    
1  No  11  -0.48  0.67  -1.42  -0.92  -0.61  -0.07  0.62 
Value 
added 
2  No  11  -0.28  0.43  -0.89  -0.64  -0.26  -0.04  0.59    
Difference        0.20  0.63  -0.70  0.03  0.14  0.23  1.92    
                     
Difference 
in 
Difference       
-0.35 
(0.15)*               
1.         standard error in brackets 
  2.    * significant at the 5% level.   45 
 
Table 9: GCSE Analysis 
 
Unit of observation is a teacher 
Dependent variable is teacher change in GCSE score 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Eligible    0.706  0.286  0.890 
    (0.371)  (0.298)  (0.366)* 
Novice        1.333 
        (0.489)** 
Spine point  -0.092  -0.181     
  (0.065)  (0.080)*     
Years in School  -0.001  -0.114  -0.120  -0.008 
  (0.015)  (0.251)  (0.254)  (0.015) 
Leadership  0.831  2.144  0.277  0.873 
  (0.927)  (1.150)  (0.789)  (0.803) 
Female teacher  0.062  -0.020  0.096  -0.003 
  (0.220)  (0.223)  (0.222)  (0.220) 
Maths dummy  -0.174  -0.191  -0.132  -0.135 
  (0.250)  (0.248)  (0.251)  (0.246) 
English dummy  -0.129  -0.114  -0.120  -0.121 
  (0.253)  (0.251)  (0.254)  (0.249) 
Constant  0.433  0.685  -0.532  -1.096 
  (0.659)  (0.667)  (0.451)  (0.488)* 
Observations  180  180  181  181 
R-squared  0.15  0.17  0.14  0.18 
 
1.  Standard errors in parentheses 
2.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
3.  Note that in the specifications involving the spine point variable we only have 180 observations, as 
one teacher has no spine point data. 
4.  Weighted by number of pupils per teacher, averaged over two tranches 
5.  All specifications have school dummies 
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Table 10: Value Added Analysis 
 
Unit of observation is a teacher 
Dependent variable is teacher change in VA score 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Eligible    0.193  0.063  0.422 
    (0.173)  (0.128)  (0.152)** 
Novice        0.539 
        (0.203)** 
Spine point  -0.022  -0.057     
  (0.027)  (0.033)     
Years in School  -0.003  -0.005  -0.006  -0.005 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Leadership  0.045  0.556  -0.005  0.236 
  (0.381)  (0.473)  (0.327)  (0.333) 
Female teacher  -0.014  -0.046  -0.001  -0.040 
  (0.091)  (0.092)  (0.092)  (0.091) 
English dummy  -0.145  -0.139  -0.134  -0.134 
  (0.104)  (0.103)  (0.105)  (0.103) 
Maths dummy  -0.337  -0.344  -0.315  -0.317 
  (0.103)**  (0.102)**  (0.104)**  (0.102)** 
Constant  0.308  0.407  -0.021  -0.249 
  (0.271)  (0.275)  (0.187)  (0.202) 
Observations  180  180  181  181 
R-squared  0.27  0.29  0.26  0.29 
 
1.  Standard errors in parentheses 
2.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
3.  Note that in the specifications involving the spine point variable we only have 180 observations, as 
one teacher has no spine point data. 
4.  Weighted by number of pupils per teacher, averaged over two tranches 
5.  All specifications have school dummies 
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Table 11: Subject Differences 
Unit of observation is a teacher 
Dependent variable is teacher change in output score 
 
  GCSE  Value added 
Eligible  1.339  0.653 
  (0.437)**  (0.180)** 
Novice  1.313  0.511 
  (0.480)**  (0.202)* 
Interaction: Eligible*   -0.771  -0.394 
English 
 
(0.667)  (0.275) 
Interaction: Eligible*  -1.138  -0.588 
Maths 
 
(0.625)  (0.257)* 
Years in School  -0.010  -0.006 
  (0.015)  (0.006) 
Leadership  0.531  0.062 
  (0.862)  (0.355) 
Female Teacher  -0.059  -0.070 
  (0.223)  (0.092) 
English dummy  0.554  0.211 
  (0.612)  (0.252) 
Maths dummy  0.791  0.162 
  (0.563)  (0.232) 
Constant  -1.468  -0.441 
  (0.524)**  (0.216)* 
Observations  181  181 
R-squared  0.20  0.31 
 
 
1.  Standard errors in parentheses 
2.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
3.  Note that in the specifications involving the spine point variable we only have 180 observations, as 
one teacher has no spine point data. 
4.  Weighted by number of pupils per teacher, averaged over two tranches 
5.  All specifications have school dummies 
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Table 12: Distributional Impacts 
Unit of observation is a teacher 
Dependent variable is: (kth percentile of outcome distribution for tranche 2 for teacher j) 
– (kth percentile of outcome distribution for tranche 1 for teacher j) 
 
Coefficient on Eligibility: 
  GCSE  Value added 
Percentile     
10
th  1.145  0.849 
  (0.516)*  (0.246)** 
25
th  1.394  0.856 
  (0.465)**  (0.220)** 
50
th  1.394  0.689 
  (0.465)**  (0.224)** 
75
th  1.753  0.562 
  (0.499)**  (0.216)* 
90
th  1.308  0.637 
  (0.522)*  (0.294)* 
 
1.  Standard errors in parentheses 
2.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
3.  Weighted by number of pupils per teacher, averaged over 2 tranches 
4.  All specifications have school dummies 
5.  Each cell reports coefficient from a different regression 
6.  Other variables included as in Table 11 
7.  All regressions have 181 observations 
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Table 13: Robustness checks 
Unit of observation is a teacher 
Dependent variable is teacher change in output score 
                                                      No Novices                           Lower 75% KS3 only      
  GCSE  VA  GCSE  VA 
Eligible  1.389  0.786  0.996  0.605 
  (0.487)**  (0.204)**  (0.421)*  (0.191)** 
Novice      1.099  0.511 
      (0.447)*  (0.203)* 
Interaction: Eligible*   -1.980  -0.962  -0.560  -0.328 
English 
 
(0.922)*  (0.386)*  (0.606)  (0.276) 
Interaction: Eligible*  -0.877  -0.772  -0.955  -0.559 
Maths 
 
(0.824)  (0.345)*  (0.579)  (0.264)* 
Years in School  -0.017  -0.007  -0.018  -0.010 
  (0.014)  (0.006)  (0.015)  (0.007) 
Leadership  -0.329  -0.267  0.381  0.139 
  (0.927)  (0.388)  (0.813)  (0.370) 
Female teacher  0.166  -0.059  0.041  -0.002 
  (0.233)  (0.097)  (0.209)  (0.095) 
English dummy  1.691  0.791  0.274  0.100 
  (0.888)  (0.372)*  (0.553)  (0.251) 
Maths dummy  0.568  0.365  0.560  0.062 
  (0.778)  (0.325)  (0.517)  (0.235) 
Constant  -1.497  -0.569  -0.924  -0.301 
  (0.560)**  (0.234)*  (0.507)  (0.231) 
Observations  164  164  178  178 
R-squared  0.20  0.32  0.17  0.32 
 
1.  Standard errors in parentheses 
2.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
3.  Weighted by number of pupils per teacher, averaged over 2 tranches 
4.  All specifications have school dummies 
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Figure 1: Distribution of teacher outcomes: GCSE 











0  2  4  6  8  GCSE 
Tranche 1  Tranche 2 
Eligible 















0  2  4  6  8  GCSE 
Tranche 1  Tranche 2 
Not Eligible 



















0  2  4  6  8  GCSE 
Tranche 1  Tranche 2 
Eligible 
















0  2  4  6  8  GCSE 
Tranche 1  Tranche 2 
Not Eligible 


















0  2  4  6  8  GCSE 
Tranche 1  Tranche 2 
Eligible 
















0  2  4  6  8  GCSE 
Tranche 1  Tranche 2 
Not Eligible 




















0  2  4  6  8  GCSE 
Tranche 1  Tranche 2 
Eligible 
















0  2  4  6  8  GCSE 
Tranche 1  Tranche 2 
Not Eligible 









   52 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of teacher outcomes: Value Added 
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Figure 3: Comparing tranche 1 and tranche 2 
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Figure 4: Comparing tranche 1 and tranche 2 
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Figure 5: Teacher outcome experience profile: GCSE 
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0  5  10  15  20 
Pay spine point in 1999 
 
   57 
 
Appendix 1: Data collection 
 
Schools were approached in several waves, between June 2000 and January 2002. The 
first wave comprised a pilot group of 40 schools, chosen from a group of about 200 
schools who had previously participated in a Department for Education and Skills (DfES, 
then DfEE) pilot value-added exercise (O’Donogue et al 1997). These schools were 
therefore known to be research aware and to have good information systems. We selected 
the 40 schools as a convenience sample of the schools closest to Bristol. The second 
wave comprised the remaining schools from the DfEE pilot group. Third and subsequent 
waves comprised schools in particular groups of LEAs, chosen to reflect a balance of 
school types and urban/rural features.  
 
Schools were approached by being sent a letter inviting them to participate, as well as a 
project outline and a stamped-addressed postcard to return indicating whether they were / 
were not willing to participate, or wanted more information before taking a decision. 
Their addresses were obtained from the DfES Performance Tables.  
 
Schools in the first wave were all telephoned after the initial, letter-based approach. 
Schools in the first and second waves who did not respond to the initial approach were 
sent a follow-up letter and subsequently telephoned. The phone calls were extremely time 
consuming (up to eight calls had to be made to each school to speak to the head, or to 
draw the issue to the head’s attention), and only a small number of schools agreed to 
participate as a result. Intensive follow-up was therefore dropped from subsequent waves, 
in favour of more extensive sampling. Given the poor response rate from our initial 
waves and the expected high drop-out rate, we invited all state maintained secondary 
schools in England to take part. 
 
After agreeing to participate, schools were sent a letter guaranteeing the confidentiality 
and security of the data and a schedule of the data required for Tranche 1 (1997 – 1999). 
To obtain additional supplementary information the headteachers of participating schools 
were interviewed or were asked to fill in a questionnaire (see Croxson and Atkinson 
(2001a, b) for more on these interviews). 
 
Participating schools were then sent a second data schedule in the Autumn of 2002, 
which specified the data required for Tranche 2 (2000 - 2002). A copy of this schedule is 
shown in Table A1. 41 schools provided Tranche 1 data, of whom 24 also provided data 
for Tranche 2. Out of this number, the data supplied by 18 schools was sufficiently 
complete for our analyses. 
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Table A1: General schedule of data requirements for pupils taking GCSEs in Summer 2002 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            Examples 
Class lists for  
 
Year 10: 2000/2001,  
Year 11: 2001/2002 
 




Names of pupils linked to the appropriate teachers for each 
of the 2 years (if classes remain the same across years do not 




Subject Setting information  (ie which group is highest ability, 
etc. if relevant) 
Class: 10A (00/01) Maths;              Class: 11G 
Teachers: Mr Smith & Ms Jones    Teachers: A Rig 
Pupils: Jo Dean, Bob Aasive,          Pupils: 
and so on for each class 
  
Maths 10A High Achievers - 10G Strugglers 
 English, no setting 
 Science S1 Double Science, S2 – 5 Single Science 
 
Information about these pupils  •  date of birth 
•  gender; 
•  postcode.  
 
for each pupil 






Jo Dean  4  D   
Bob Aasive  4  C   
Tane Mujab  7  A*  … 
Test and exam information for these pupils  KS3 test scores for these pupils, in each of Maths, English and 
Science  
 
GCSE Results and Exam Board in each of Maths, English and 
Science 
 
and so on for each pupil 
Teacher  Date of birth  Gender   
Ms Jones  09/07/66  F   
Mr Smith  08/04/61  M   
Characteristics of the teachers who taught 
them 
 
•  date of birth;  
•  gender; 
•  subject(s) taught; 
•  length of time at school at 1/9/01; 
•  total salary at 1/9/00;     total salary at 1/9/01; 
•  spine point at 1/9/00;     spine point at 1/9/01; 
•  whether they were (a) eligible for; (b) applied for; 
(c) awarded Threshold Payment in 2001; 
•  whether they were (a) eligible for; (b) applied for; 
(c) awarded Threshold Payment in 2002. 
 
and so on for each teacher 
Information about the school  •  total number of teachers in the school; full time and part 
time at 1/9/00 AND 1/9/01; 
•  number of teachers that were (a) eligible for; (b) applied 
for; (c) awarded a Threshold payment in 2001; 
•  number of teachers that were (a) eligible for; (b) applied 
for; (c) awarded Threshold payment in 2002. 
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1997   
Tranche 1 
take KS3





1998                                                                                              
June 




















GCSEs                                                                                             
First Performance 
Threshold Year
July 2000  
First PT 
Evaluation
Sept 1999      
Scheme 
Introduced 
and 
Eligibility 
Defined
 
 